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ELIDING IN NEW YORK† 
MONTE NEIL STEWART* 
elision, noun . . . . The act or an instance of omitting something.1 
elide, verb . . . . To eliminate or leave out of consideration.2 
 
In January 2006, this Journal published an article3 that set forth the 
social institutional argument for man/woman marriage, demonstrated 
how that argument is a sufficient response to all constitutional attacks 
leveled at the laws sustaining that social institution, and detailed how 
the courts mandating genderless marriage (and the dissenting judges 
favoring that result) had elided the argument (“the Judicial Elision 
article”). Since the Judicial Elision article’s early December 2005 cut-
off date, two more instances of judicial elision of social institutional 
realities have cropped up in New York. Both are dissenting opinions, 
one in the Appellate Division and one in the Court of Appeals. Because 
those dissenting opinions are interesting, and engagement with them 
intellectually productive, this article critically examines both. In 
preparation for doing so, and as an aid to the reader, this article also 
summarizes central aspects of the social institutional argument as set 





 †  This article was also published as 1 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 221 (2006). 
 * © Monte Neil Stewart, 2006. I thank Bill Duncan, Andrea Pace, Spencer Hall, Joel 
Blickenstaff, Wendy Woodfield, and Tom Schofield for their valuable assistance in the 
preparation of this article. Portions of this article were presented at the "Marriage Debates" 
Conference at the University of California, Los Angeles *Apr. 21, 2006). This article is also 
available on-line at www.manwomanmarriage.org. 
 1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2006). 
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I.  A CONCISE SUMMARY OF THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL 
ARGUMENT 
It has been called, cleverly but aptly, “The War of the Ring.”4 It is 
being waged all across the public square, but the hottest and most 
consequential battles are in the courts. On one side are those who 
want marriage legally redefined to “the union of any two persons,” 
with the law treating the parties’ gender as irrelevant to the civil 
meaning of marriage—hence, genderless marriage. On the other side 
are those who want to preserve “the union of a man and a woman” as 
a core meaning of the marriage institution—hence, man/woman 
marriage. 
The social institutional argument is emerging as the clearest and 
strongest explication of society’s (and, hence, government’s) 
compelling interests in man/woman marriage. Before summarizing 
that argument, however, certain of its extraordinary aspects merit 
note. 
Each building block in the argument is uncontroversial. Virtually 
all serious students of social institutions accept the validity of the 
understandings comprising it.5 
To date, the argument remains unrefuted. The appellate courts 
that have mandated genderless marriage (in Massachusetts and 
Canada), in order to reach that result, ignored or otherwise evaded 
the argument, and these courts’ elision of the argument is now well 
demonstrated in the scholarly literature.6 In contrast, the courts that 
have engaged the argument have rejected genderless marriage.7 
Likewise, none of the serious legal scholars supporting genderless 
marriage have genuinely engaged and countered the argument.8 
The argument fully qualifies as Rawlsian “public reason”9 and 
satisfies even Linda McClain’s high standard: “The requirements of 
 
 4. Daniel Cere, The War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE 
DANGERS IN CANADA'S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 
2004) [hereinafter Divorcing Marriage]. 
 5. Stewart, supra note 3, at 8–27. 
 6. Id. at 28–60. 
 7. E.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); id. at 275–78 
(Parrillo, J., concurring); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983–1005 
(Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 8. Stewart, supra note 3, at 60–77. 
 9. E.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
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public reason would . . . require the delineation of precisely how 
same-sex marriages threaten the institution of marriage in terms of 
public reasons and political values implicit in our public culture.”10 
This achievement of the social institutional argument merits emphasis 
exactly because of what Margaret Somerville has accurately observed: 
One strategy used by same-sex marriage advocates is to label all 
people who oppose same-sex marriage as doing so for religious or 
moral reasons in order to dismiss them and their arguments as 
irrelevant to public policy. [Further,] good secular reasons to 
oppose same-sex marriage are re-characterized as religious or as 
based on personal morality and, therefore, as not applicable at a 
societal level.11 
Because the argument demonstrates that adoption of genderless 
marriage will necessarily de-institutionalize man/woman marriage, 
and thereby cause the loss of its unique social goods, the argument 
effectively refutes the notion that the proponents of man/woman 
marriage have only one “real” motive: animus towards gay men and 
lesbians.12 
Because the argument demonstrates society’s (and hence the 
government’s) compelling interests in preserving the vital social 
institution of man/woman marriage, the argument is a sufficient 
response to all constitutional challenges leveled at the laws sustaining 
that institution, and that is so regardless of what standard of review 
the court applies.13 
 
 10. Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1998). 
 11. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra 
note 4, at 70–71. She goes on to note that these tactics "do not serve the best interests of either 
individuals or society in this debate." Id. at 71. 
 12. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 ("The absence of any reasonable relationship 
between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter 
into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, 
suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are 
(or who are believed to be) homosexual."); Editorial, For Gay Marriage, Boston Globe, July 8, 
2003, at A18 ("For all the legal acrobatics offered by opponents, it is hard to see how anything 
other than an animus toward gays and lesbians prevents them from obtaining the same 'benefits 
and protections' enjoyed by heterosexual couples."); GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & 
DEFENDERS, IS DOMA DOOMED?: THE FEDERAL "DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT" AND 
STATE ANTI-GAY, ANTI-MARRIAGE LAWS 13 (2001), available at http://www.glad.org/rights/ 
IsDOMADoomed.pdf ("DOMA's sheer breadth and its lack of any connection to a legitimate 
legislative end demonstrates that it can only be explained by anti-gay animus."). 
 13. Stewart, supra note 3, at 27–28. 
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The social institutional argument for man/woman marriage is a 
sufficient response because of what it succeeds in demonstrating.14 It 
demonstrates that marriage, like all social institutions, is constituted 
by a web of shared public meanings; that these meanings teach, form, 
and transform individuals, providing identities, purposes, and projects; 
and that in this way, these meanings provide vital social goods. Across 
time and cultures, a core meaning constitutive of the marriage 
institution has virtually always been the union of a man and a woman. 
This core man/woman meaning is powerful and even indispensable 
for the marriage institution’s production of at least six of its valuable 
social goods. The man/woman marriage institution is: 
Society’s best and probably only effective means to make real the 
right of a child to know and be brought up by his or her biological 
parents (with exceptions justified only in the best interests of the 
child, not those of any adult). 
The most effective means humankind has developed to maximize 
the private welfare provided to children conceived by passionate, 
heterosexual coupling (with “private welfare” meaning not just the 
basic requirements like food and shelter but also education, play, 
work, discipline, love, and respect). 
The indispensable foundation for that child-rearing mode—that is, 
married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways not 
subject to reasonable dispute) with the optimal outcomes deemed 
crucial for a child’s—and therefore society’s—well being. 
Society’s primary and most effective means of bridging the male-
female divide. 
Society’s only means of conferring the identity of, and 
transforming, a male into husband/father and a female into 
wife/mother statuses and identities particularly beneficial to society. 
Social and official endorsement of that form of adult intimacy—
married heterosexual intercourse—that society may rationally value 
above all other such forms. That rationality has been demonstrated in 
the scholarly literature and remains, to date, unrefuted. 
The social institutional argument further demonstrates that, with 
its power to suppress social meanings, the law can radically change 
 
 14. Because the remainder of this section is a summary of the Judicial Elision article, 
Stewart, supra note 3, it is presented without further footnoting. 
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and even deinstitutionalize man/woman marriage, with concomitant 
loss of the institution’s social goods. Further, genderless marriage is a 
radically different institution than man/woman marriage, as evidenced 
by the large divergence in the nature of their respective social goods 
(in the case of genderless marriage, only promised, not yet delivered). 
Indeed, observers of marriage who are both rigorous and well-
informed regarding the realities of social institutions uniformly 
acknowledge the magnitude of the differences between the two 
possible institutions of marriage, and this is so regardless of the 
observer’s own sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or 
preference. 
Another social institutional reality is that a society can have, at 
any one time, only one social institution denominated marriage. That 
is because a society, as a simple matter of reality, cannot, at one and 
the same time, have as shared, core, constitutive meanings of the 
marriage institution “the union of a man and a woman” and “the 
union of any two persons.” A society, as a simple matter of reality, 
cannot, at one and the same time, tell people, and especially children, 
that marriage means “the union of a man and a woman” and “the 
union of any two persons.” The one meaning necessarily displaces the 
other. Hence, every society must choose either to retain the old 
man/woman marriage institution or, by force of law, to suppress it and 
put in its place the radically different genderless marriage institution. 
But to suppress, by force of “constitutional” law no less, the shared 
public meanings constituting the old institution is to lose the valuable 
social goods flowing from those institutionalized meanings. Thus, the 
social institutional argument refutes the “no-downside” argument 
advanced by genderless marriage proponents and seen in the famous 
tactic of asking: “How will letting Jim and John marry hurt Monte’s 
and Anne’s marriage?” 
These social institutional realities further reveal phrases like gay 
marriage or same-sex marriage to be misleading. These phrases get 
people thinking that a society will keep its old kind of marriage and 
just get a new and separate kind. But that is not so because of the 
social institutional realities just reviewed; a society can have one or 
the other but never at the same time both possible kinds of civil 
marriage. And after a judicial decree of genderless marriage, made in 
the name of constitutional norms of equality, liberty, dignity, or 
autonomy, an American state will certainly not be the happy home of 
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many different marriage norm communities, each doing its own 
marriage thing, each equally valid before the law, and each equally 
secure in its own space. Rather, that state will have one marriage 
norm community (genderless marriage) officially sanctioned and 
officially protected; all other marriage norm communities will be 
officially constrained, officially disdained, and sharply curtailed. 
Moreover, there are profound problems with the notion that 
supporters of the old marriage institution can, if they want, just 
huddle together in some linguistic, social, or religious enclave to 
preserve the old institution and its meanings. Social institutional 
studies teach that the dominant society and its language and meanings 
will, like an ocean and its waves, inevitably wear down and cause to 
disappear any island enclave of an opposing norm. To the degree that 
members of the enclave were to adopt the speech of the dominant 
society, they would lose the power to name, and in large part the 
power to discern, what once mattered to their forbears. To that 
degree, their forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them, and 
probably even unintelligible. 
II.  THE NEW YORK GENDERLESS MARRIAGE LITIGATION 
In New York, genderless marriage proponents prosecuted five 
different civil actions in five different state trial courts.15 In each 
action, the claim was that the state constitution required that marriage 
be redefined from the union of a man and a woman to the union of 
any two persons.16 Four trial courts rejected the claim17 (and garnered 
 
 15. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Kane v. Marsolais, Index 
No. 3473-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, Index 
No. 1967-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (unpublished); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2005); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 16. The organizations supporting these and similar state court actions across the country 
are united in a firm resolve that the definition-of-marriage issue not be raised now or in the 
foreseeable future, whether in state or federal court, as a federal constitutional claim. This 
resolve is based on the organizations' judgment that for now and in the foreseeable future the 
federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, will reject such a federal genderless 
marriage claim. Maverick lawyers and plaintiffs (that is, those not acting under the control of 
these organizations) have nevertheless made the federal claim three times, losing twice in 
federal district court and once in federal bankruptcy court. Smelt v. Orange County, 374 F. 
Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re 
Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 137–38 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). The losing lawyer and plaintiffs in the 
Florida federal action initially vowed publicly to appeal the adverse decision all the way to the 
Supreme Court but subsequently bowed to organizational pressure in foregoing any appeal. 
When the losing lawyer and plaintiffs in the California federal action did not bow to similar 
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little media attention), while one, in the case of Hernandez v. Robles18 
in the Borough of Manhattan, accepted the claim (and garnered 
massive media attention). On appeal, the Third Department of the 
Appellate Division, by a 5-0 vote, affirmed three of the four trial court 
decisions in favor of man/woman marriage;19 the fourth is still pending 
before the Second Department.20 The First Department, with a three-
judge majority opinion21 and a one-judge concurring opinion,22 
reversed the trial court decision in Hernandez. One judge, however, 
dissented, arguing that the state constitution required the redefinition 
of marriage.23 That dissenting opinion (“the AD dissenting opinion”) 
is the first of the two that I examine. 
All these Appellate Department decisions were appealed to the 
Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court. On July 6, 2006, the Court 
of Appeals, by a 4-to-2 vote, held that the state laws defining marriage 
as the union of a man and a woman did not violate the New York 
constitution.24 The court issued three opinions. Three justices joined 
the plurality opinion.25 A fourth justice wrote a concurring opinion, 
which one of the three in the plurality also joined.26 The chief justice’s 
dissenting opinion was joined by one other justice (“the COA 
dissenting opinion”).27 (The seventh justice had previously recused 
himself.) Like the AD dissenting opinion, the COA dissenting opinion 
 
pressure but pursued an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the organizations, 
Equality California, moved to intervene before the Ninth Circuit to urge that the appeal be 
dismissed on justiciability grounds. Opening Brief of Proposed Intervenor Equality California at 
3, Smelt v. County of Orange, No. 05-56040 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit denied the 
intervention motion but ultimately ruled as the proposed intervenor desired; that is, the court 
avoided the federal constitutional issue by ordering dismissal on justiciability grounds. Smelt v. 
County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 685–86 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 17. Kane, Index No. 3473-04; Samuels, Index No. 1967-04; Seymour, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 858; 
Shields, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 270. 
 18. 794 N.Y.S.2d at 579. 
 19. Kane v. Marsolais, 808 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Samuels v. N.Y. State 
Dep't of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Seymour v. Holcomb, 811 N.Y.S.2d 
134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 20. Shields v. Madigan, --- N.Y.S.2d --- (N.Y. App. Div. ----). 
 21. Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 22. Id. at 363–77 (Catterson, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 377–89 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 24. Hernandez v. Robles, No. 86, 2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. July 6, 2006). 
 25. Id. at *1–7. 
 26. Id. at *7–14 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at *14–23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
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is also interesting and engagement with it intellectually productive. 
Accordingly, I also examine it. 
III.  THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT DISSENTING OPINION AND ITS 
ELISIONS 
In rejecting the state constitutional claim for genderless marriage, 
the three-judge majority opinion and the one-judge concurring 
opinion in Hernandez AD acknowledged fundamental aspects of the 
social institutional argument; this occurred primarily by citation to 
and approving quotation from28 Justice Cordy’s articulation of the 
argument in Goodridge.29 
With respect to the AD dissenting opinion, it is interesting that the 
social institutional argument engages most points attempted by it. But 
that is not to say that the AD dissenting opinion engages the social 
institutional argument. Although the AD dissenting opinion uses the 
word institution in connection with marriage twenty-one times, that 
opinion, other than acknowledging that marriage is a valuable social 
institution, otherwise ignores the social institutional argument. In 
doing so, it makes assertions about the nature of the marriage 
institution that appear to be rather clearly at odds with 
understandings provided by social institutional studies. 
A. The “Convenient False Assumption” Elision 
An important aspect of the AD dissenting opinion is its bold use 
of what may fairly be called the “convenient false assumption” elision. 
Although positing the institutional nature of marriage and the 
institution’s high value, the AD dissenting opinion proceeds 
throughout on the assumption that the institution is not constituted 
by its shared public meanings or, perhaps, on the more narrow 
assumption that “the union of a man and a woman” is not now one of 
those constitutive meanings or, perhaps, on the even more narrow 
assumption that the man/woman meaning, although present, is not 
productive of anything socially valuable. 
 
 28. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360; id. at 375–76 (Catterson, J., concurring). 
 29. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
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Regarding the broadest possible assumption explanatory of the 
AD dissenting opinion’s performance, it is true that the opinion 
nowhere acknowledges that social institutions of betterment are 
constituted by shared public meanings, which in turn teach, form, and 
transform individuals in ways productive of social goods valuable to 
society. But the opinion nowhere expressly denies that particular and 
uncontroversial social institutional reality. So, fairness seems to 
dictate that the AD dissenting opinion not be taken to task for 
proceeding on the broadest possible assumption. 
Regarding the more narrow assumption, that the man/woman 
meaning is not now constitutive of the marriage institution, the AD 
dissenting opinion does make an explicit effort in that direction: 
It is fair to say that both the law and the population generally now 
view marriage, at least in the abstract ideal, as a partnership of 
equals with equal rights, who have mutually joined to form a new 
family unit, founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial 
and emotional support. . . . [T]he gender of the two partners to a 
marriage is no longer critical to its definition.30 
The AD dissenting opinion then refers to this asserted model as “a 
widely held view”31 of marriage and a bit later calls it “our current 
understanding of the definition and purpose of marriage.”32 
What the AD dissenting opinion is doing here is asserting that 
marriage is nothing more than a close personal relationship, meaning 
a relationship stripped of any goal or end beyond the intrinsic 
emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction that the relationship 
brings to the two adults involved.33 But it has become clear that a 
judge intent on redefining marriage through an equality argument 
must assert, as the AD dissenting opinion does, that marriage is 
nothing more than a close personal relationship.34 That is because to 
 
 30. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 382. 
 33. For an excellent summary of the close personal relationship model of marriage, see 
DANIEL CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH 
AMERICA 14–15 (Council on Family Law, 2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/ 
pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf. 
 34. If the AD dissenting opinion were to assert (it clearly does not) that the close personal 
relationship model is all that marriage "ought" to be, it would have distinguished company. That 
"ought" is what drove the drafters of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution and, in Canada, the Law Commission's Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing 
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reject that model because it is factually inadequate (that is, true as far 
as it goes but going not nearly far enough) is to reject the equality 
argument for genderless marriage. That is exactly what we see in the 
court decisions sustaining the man/woman marriage institution.35 The 
other side of the coin is that judicial acceptance of the close personal 
relationship model’s accuracy and adequacy is the always-present 
foundation for judicial acceptance of the equality argument.36 But, to 
date, judicial acceptance of the close personal relationship model has 
been an unexamined and unproven starting point of analysis, not the 
result of thoughtful examination.37 
When the AD dissenting opinion asserts that the close personal 
relationship model is now—after a process of evolution—all that 
marriage is, it is just wrong as a matter of fact. Although it is not 
wrong in some American communities or in portions of that world 
created by Hollywood, it is wrong, on the ground, across New York 
and the nation. The fundamental inadequacy in the descriptive power 
of the close personal relationship model is recognized by the 
Hernandez AD majority and the other courts and judges who have 
actually and seriously examined that supposedly complete description 
of marriage.38 Although the contemporary social institution of 
marriage undoubtedly includes the “ideal” of “a partnership of equals 
with equal rights, who have mutually joined to form a new family unit, 
 
and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships. See CERE, supra note 33, at 16–20. But, of 
course, there are competing social theories as to what marriage "ought" to be, both in the 
academy and across the electorate, and at least since the time of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., it has been considered bad judicial form to anoint, in the name of constitutional equality or 
liberty or whatnot, one social theory and to suppress the competing social theories, especially 
those embedded in democratically promulgated laws—like the state and federal "defense of 
marriage" acts and constitutional amendments. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of 
Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 95-99 (2004). 
 35. E.g., Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360; Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo, J., concurring) ("This distillation of marriage down to its pure 
'close personal relationship' essence, however, strips the social institution 'of any goal or end 
beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction which the relationship 
brings to the individuals involved. . . .' Yet, the marital form traditionally has embraced so much 
more . . . ."). 
 36. Stewart, supra note 34, at 97–98. 
 37. This obvious feature of cases such as Ontario's Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] D.L.R. 529, 
and Massachusetts' Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), has 
led Douglas Farrow to label, and fairly so, their approach as "obviously circular, and viciously 
so." Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 4, at 
98–99. See also Stewart, supra note 34, at 95–99. 
 38. See, e.g, Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 359–60; Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 275–76 
(Parillo, J., concurring). 
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founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional 
support,”39 enduring aspects of the institution go far beyond that 
limited and limiting description of transformative meanings: 
 Conjugal marriage [i.e., man/woman marriage] has several 
characteristics. First, it is inherently normative. Conjugal marriage 
cannot celebrate an infinite array of sexual or intimate choices as 
equally desirable or valid. Instead, its very purpose lies in 
channeling the erotic and interpersonal impulses between men and 
women in a particular direction: one in which men and women 
commit to each other and to the children that their sexual unions 
commonly (and even at times unexpectedly) produce. 
 As an institution, conjugal marriage addresses the social 
problem that men and women are sexually attracted to each other 
and that, without any outside guidance or social norms, these 
intense attractions can cause immense personal and social damage. 
. . . [Man/woman marriage] provides an evolving form of life that 
helps men and women negotiate the sex divide, forge an intimate 
community of life, and provide a stable social setting for their 
children . . . . 
 Another characteristic of conjugal marriage is that it is 
fundamentally child-centered, focused beyond the couple towards 
the next generation. Not every married couple has or wants 
children. But at its core marriage has always had something to do 
with societies’ recognition of the fundamental importance of the 
sexual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female, men 
and woman often have sex, babies often result, and those babies, 
on average, seem to do better when their mother and father 
cooperate in their care. Conjugal marriage attempts to sustain 
enduring bonds between women and men in order to give a baby 
its mother and father, to bond them to one another and to the 
baby.40 
 
 39. Hernandez AD, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 40. CERE, supra note 4, at 12–13. Further descriptions of the meanings and purposes 
inhering in contemporary man/woman marriage—meanings beyond those few comprising the 
close personal relationship model—can be found. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 34, at 41–58; 
Stewart, supra note 3, at 16–20; Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage 
as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 43–51 (2004); 
and Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal 
Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
447, 451–71 (2004). 
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On this issue of “the union of a man and a woman” subsisting or 
not as a core and constitutive meaning of the contemporary American 
marriage institution, the AD dissenting opinion falters badly. That the 
man/woman meaning is no longer a constituent of the contemporary 
institution is, after all, an assertion of supposed fact—an is, not an 
ought.41 And facts are stubborn things. The continuing force of that 
meaning in the institution seems no less factual in the face of the AD 
dissenting opinion’s bald assertions to the contrary. After all, those 
assertions are just that, bald; they appear unsupported by proof of any 
type.42 In contrast, proof is present that “the union of a man and 
woman” continues as a strongly shared public meaning among the 
complex of other meanings constitutive of the contemporary 
institution. One such proof is the simple social fact that forty states 
and the federal government, within just the past decade or so, have 
enacted “defense of marriage” acts and/or constitutional amendments 
expressing that shared meaning and declining to deviate from it in 
cases of foreign genderless marriages.43 It bears repeating that these 
laws are very recent social expressions, not the vestiges of “long-
accepted assumptions that . . . have eroded.”44 Moreover, there is this 
reality: 
[I]nstitutions are not worn out by continued use, but each use of 
the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution. Cars and 
shirts wear out as we use them but constant use renews and 
strengthens institutions such as marriage . . . . [I]n terms of the 
continued collective intentionality of the users, each use of the 
institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users 
to the institution.45 
In 2004, nearly 4.5 million Americans made such an intentional 
renewed expression of their commitment to the man/woman marriage 
institution by marrying and thereby becoming a husband or a wife.46 
 
 41. See supra note 34. 
 42. Serious scholarship provides no supporting proof, although some popular literature 
does. E.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR 
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005). 
 43. William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 234, 234–35 nn.2, 3 (2005) (collecting citations to statutes and amendments 
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman). 
 44. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 45. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 57 (1995). 
 46. The number of people who married in the United States in 2004 was 4,558,000. 
Subtracting the people who married in Massachusetts (83,098), the number would be 4,474,902. 
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Thus, it seems difficult to take seriously the AD dissenting opinion’s 
apparent assumption that the man/woman meaning is not now 
constitutive of the marriage institution across the nation, including 
New York.47 
I turn now to the narrowest possible assumption explanatory of 
the judicial performance reflected in the AD dissenting opinion: that 
the man/woman meaning still constitutive of the marriage institution 
is, quite simply, without value. But here again, unfortunately, the 
opinion relies exclusively on bald assertions. It asserts: “It is marriage 
itself, the institution by which two individuals join together to form a 
family unit, that contains the virtues the state may legitimately seek to 
protect. The traditional limitation of that institution to heterosexual 
couples is not similarly valuable.”48 Furthermore, it states: “This 
availability of the institution to opposite-sex couples neither 
encourages opposite-sex couples to choose to marry, nor encourages 
them to procreate only within marriage.”49 
The judicial performance reflected in these assertions must be 
adjudged at least disappointing because of the reliance on ipse dixit, 
the resulting failure to marshal any supporting proof, and so forth. 
The performance is disappointing most fundamentally because the 
assertions are breathtakingly erroneous. In a rather straightforward 
manner, the Judicial Elision article demonstrates how the man/woman 
meaning is not just important but essential to the marriage 
institution’s production of at least six valuable social goods.50 And the 
assertion that the man/woman marriage institution is not effective in 
encouraging “opposite-sex couples to choose to marry . . . [or] to 
procreate only within marriage” is—if given a straightforward 
reading—beyond the pale. Certainly, the institution is not completely 
successful with those two social tasks, but to say (as the AD dissenting 
opinion rather clearly seems to say) that the man/woman marriage 
institution in this nation utterly fails with those two tasks is 
 
Brady E. Hamilton et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces, 
and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004, 53 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPORTS NO. 21, at 1, 6 (June 
28, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_21.pdf. 
 47. Of course, the man/woman meaning is currently being suppressed in Massachusetts by 
force of law. In those circumstances, the deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage seems 
likely to be accomplished sooner rather than later, absent a change in the law. 
 48. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 390. 
 50. Stewart, supra note 3, at 16–20. 
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indefensible. A substantial majority of Americans choose to enter 
man/woman marriage,51 and a substantial majority of American births 
are legitimate.52 
The question arises whether the AD dissenting opinion really 
intended to say that a social institution denominated marriage, but 
devoid of the man/woman meaning, would be equally successful with 
those two social tasks. If so, then the opinion is engaging in a 
somewhat different elision of social institutional realities, one seen in 
other parts of the opinion and fairly called the “institution-apart-
from-its-meanings” elision. I turn to that now. 
B. The “Institution-Apart-From-Its-Meanings” Elision 
The following is, rather clearly, central to the AD dissenting 
opinion’s analysis: Substitution of the new constitutive meaning—“the 
union of any two persons”—for the old meaning—“the union of a 
man and a woman”—leaves the marriage institution the same for all 
important purposes, with the corollary being that there is no “down-
side” to the substitution. Thus, the opinion denies that “allowing same-
sex couples to marry will have any effect on the continued survival of 
the institution itself or even its ongoing vitality among heterosexuals. 
Marriage remains . . . .”53 In the same vein, it rejects “the conclusion 
that excluding same-sex couples from marrying will substantially 
assist in achieving the protection of the institution generally.”54 
Further, it asserts: “It is marriage itself, the institution by which two 
individuals join together to form a family unit, that contains the 
virtues the state may legitimately seek to protect. The traditional 
limitation of that institution to heterosexual couples is not similarly 
valuable.”55 
The social institutional argument demonstrates the problematic 
nature of the AD dissenting opinion’s view of the matter. That 
 
 51. The National Marriage Project report for 2005 states, "[f]or the generation of 1995, 
assuming a continuation of then current marriage rates, several demographers projected that 88 
percent of women and 82 percent of men would ever marry." National Marriage Project, The 
State of Our Unions 2005, at 16–17 (2005), http://marriage.rutgers.edu. 
 52. The births to married women in 2004 were 64.3 percent of all births. Brady E. Hamilton 
et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births: Preliminary Data for 2004, 54 NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REPORTS NO. 8, at 3 (Dec. 29, 2005). 
 53. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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argument demonstrates most fundamentally that institutional 
meanings matter, that those meanings constitute the institution, and, 
magnified by institutional power and influence, those meanings form 
and transform individuals in ways productive of valuable social 
goods.56 The argument further demonstrates that a “social institution 
defined at its core as the union of any two persons is unmistakably 
different from the historic marriage institution between a man and a 
woman.”57 It also demonstrates that the profound difference between 
the two possible marriage institutions is uniformly acknowledged by 
“[o]bservers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed 
regarding the realities of social institutions” regardless of their own 
“sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or preference.”58 In 
addition, “the radical difference between the two possible marriage 
institutions [is further evidenced by] . . . the profound difference in 
social goods provided.”59 The argument further demonstrates that our 
society or any society can, by force of law, choose and sustain one or 
the other possible marriage institution but cannot have both at the 
same time.60 Finally, for the law to set up the new institution and 
suppress the old one is to assure the loss of the valuable social goods 
uniquely provided by man/woman marriage. Although that loss may 
not happen immediately, it will happen sooner rather than later.61 
These social institutional realities rather thoroughly undermine 
the AD dissenting opinion’s foundational notion that, for all purposes 
that matter, the marriage institution will be unchanged regardless of 
which of the two possible core meanings constitute it, “the union of 
any two persons” or “the union of a man and a woman.” The AD 
dissenting opinion’s analysis falters exactly because fundamentally 
different meanings, when magnified by institutional power and 
influence, do not produce the same social identities, aspirations, 
projects, or ways of behaving. In other words, the man/woman 
marriage institution will socially construct a people and hence a 
society different from the people and society socially constructed by 
the genderless marriage institution. It could not be otherwise because 
 
 56. Stewart, supra note 3, at 8–10, 16–20. 
 57. Id. at 20. 
 58. Id. at 20 n.53. 
 59. Id. at 21. 
 60. Id. at 24–25. 
 61. Id. at 6. 
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the genderless marriage institution is radically different in what it 
aims for and in what it teaches. To say that the result will be otherwise 
(as the AD dissenting opinion does) is to say that the core meanings 
constitutive of powerful social institutions do not matter in the 
formation and transformation of individuals, and no rational and 
informed observer says that. 
These social institutional realities also rather completely refute 
the corollary that underpins the AD dissenting opinion’s analysis—
that society will lose nothing of value if it chooses (or has imposed on 
it by judicial mandate) genderless marriage. That corollary is invalid 
because, as has been demonstrated, the man/woman meaning is both a 
constitutive core of the institution not just important but essential to 
the institution’s production of a number of valuable social goods. To 
lose the man/woman meaning must mean the loss of those goods, 
which would seem to qualify as a very big “down-side” indeed. 
C. The “Evolving Marriage Institution” Counter 
The Judicial Elision article considered at length the “evolving 
marriage institution” counter to the social institutional argument.62 
The AD dissenting opinion uses that counter. Thus, “[t]he institution 
of marriage has changed remarkably over the centuries,”63 and judicial 
support for man/woman marriage now “fails to recognize the extent 
to which the fundamental characteristics of the institution have 
changed, and continue to change, over time.”64 The Hernandez 
majority makes “a determined effort to avoid acknowledging these 
fundamental changes in the institution of marriage as well as in our 
society generally.”65 
For the “evolving marriage institution” counter to carry the day 
for genderless marriage, it must do one of two things. Either it must 
show that the “evolution” has removed the constitutive meaning of 
“the union of a man and a woman” from the contemporary marriage 
institution so that the law’s task is simply to “adjust accordingly,”66 or 
it must demonstrate that the change not yet (and maybe never to be) 
 
 62. Stewart, supra note 3, at 61–70. 
 63. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 381–82. 
 65. Id. at 382. 
 66. Id. at 381 ("As the institution of marriage has been redefined within modern American 
society, the law has adjusted accordingly."). 
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chosen or “evolved” by society is so wise that a court ought to impose 
it on society by no less than the force of “constitutional” law. The AD 
dissenting opinion makes neither showing. Its failure regarding the 
first task is examined in the preceding subsections. Its failure to see its 
own failure with that first task is apparently what prevents any 
genuine effort toward the second task. But then, the best academic 
advocates of the “evolving marriage institution” counter have likewise 
failed with both tasks.67 
As demonstrated in the Judicial Elision article, the arrival of 
genderless marriage in North America is not the result of institutional 
changes (evolution) resulting from forces other than the law; rather, it 
is the result of law-mandated institutional change.68 “[I]t was EGALE, 
Halpern, and Goodridge that switched the meaning of marriage at its 
core, not society.”69 Nor has anyone yet demonstrated that the net 
benefit (if any) to society from the imposition of genderless marriage 
and the suppression of man/woman marriage is so great that 
constitutional doctrine justifies such a judicially mandated change. 
These two serious deficiencies in the “evolving marriage institution” 
counter to the social institutional argument appear fatal to the 
counter. In failing to engage or, apparently, even consider these 
deficiencies, the judicial performance reflected in the AD dissenting 
opinion disappoints, and not a little.70 
D. A Pre-Political Institution and John Locke 
The AD dissenting opinion’s opening words are intriguing: “Civil 
marriage is an institution created by the state . . . .”71 Whether the state 
created the marriage institution or whether, once the state emerged in 
human society, it simply acted on or interacted with a pre-existing 
marriage institution (hence, a “pre-political institution”) is the subject 
 
 67. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 61–70. 
 68. Id. at 63–64. 
 69. Id. at 64. 
 70. Another aspect of the AD dissenting opinion also implicates social institutional 
understandings: the opinion deploys repeatedly the argument of the racial analogy, also known 
as the argument of the Perez/Loving analogy. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 379–81, 381 n.3, 382 
(Saxe, J., dissenting). Because the COA dissenting opinion does the same, that matter is 
discussed infra in section IV.E. 
 71. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 377 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
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of some reflection and debate.72 With its opening words, the AD 
dissenting opinion votes for the “state-created” conclusion. Joseph 
Raz seems to best capture the more widely-supported view, using 
language that describes state support for a pre-political institution: 
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social 
institutions which enjoy unanimous support in the community, in 
order to give them formal recognition, bring legal and 
administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their 
use by members of the community who wish to do so, and 
encourage the transmission of belief in their value to future 
generations. In many countries this is the significance of the legal 
recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of 
polygamy.73 
In any event, the AD dissenting opinion, soon after boldly 
asserting the “state-created” conclusion and apparently not aware of 
the inconsistency, actually supports rather powerfully the contrary 
conclusion. It does so by stating that “concepts of natural law that 
pre-existed our constitution” were influentially advanced by “such 
distinguished thinkers as . . . John Locke” and thereby became the 
source of the contemporary constitutional notion of fundamental 
rights, with one of those being the “fundamental right to marry.”74 
That fundamental right, according to the AD dissenting opinion, 
requires judicially-mandated genderless marriage.75 Yet Locke, like 
other Enlightenment thinkers, appreciated the value of forms of social 
order separate from the state, “institutions of civil society” or “civil 
institutions,” that, in Locke’s view, included what he called “conjugal 
society,” meaning marriage and family.76 Locke viewed conjugal 
 
 72. See, e.g., F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, 
and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619, 621–28, 633–35 (2003). 
 73. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 161 (1986); see DeCoste, supra note 72, at 
635. 
 74. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 379 ("It is therefore unassailable that the due process clause of New York's 
Constitution, like the Federal Constitution, protects, as fundamental, the right to marry, and 
more particularly, to marry the person of one's choosing."). 
 76. Seana Sugrue, Soft Despotism and Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF 
MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, & MORALS 172, 173, 175 (Robert P. George & Jean B. 
Elshtain eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE]. Locke defined conjugal society 
as follows: 
[Conjugal society] is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and 
though it consist[s] chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies, as 
is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support, and 
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society as one of those “forms of social order the existence of which 
are independent of the state.” He used the term, “pre-political social 
order.”77 Indeed, “Locke’s political philosophy . . . does have the merit 
of being of historical importance [relative to American constitutions, 
as recognized by the AD dissenting opinion] and of stipulating clearly 
that rights and responsibilities, including those pertaining to conjugal 
society, are not created by the state”78 but are “[n]ormative 
institutions . . . exist[ing] because they are compelling forms of social 
order that advance basic human goods.”79 Thus, by invoking Locke in 
the context of the “natural” or “fundamental” right to marry 
(probably rightly), the AD dissenting opinion appears to be rather 
unknowingly and effectively refuting its own opening words about a 
state-created institution. This bizarre judicial performance may well 
be explained by this insight: “Institutions of civil society are too often 
ignored by judges and political theorists alike who tend to focus 
almost exclusively on the state and its relation to individuals, as 
though the state were the only desirable form of social order for the 
advancement of human goods.”80 
The AD dissenting opinion is probably doing even more than 
refuting its own opening words; by invoking Locke, it is probably 
laying well the foundation for rejection of its own ultimate 
conclusion—that the court should redefine marriage from the union 
of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons: 
 To function effectively, each of these [civil] institutions 
[identified by Locke, including marriage and conjugal society] 
requires the state to maintain a measure of respectful distance and 
to uphold their core norms. There is no guarantee, however, that 
the state will do so, and when it does not, the governance that 
results in these spheres tends to range from the inept to the 
despotic . . . . 
 
assistance, and a communion of interest too, as necessary not only to unite their care 
and affection; but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be 
nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves. 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47 (R. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 
1982) (1690). 
 77. Sugrue, supra note 76, at 176. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 173–74. 
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 As marriage is a normative institution, the move to redefine it by 
erasing one of its constitutive norms is a potent attack, one that 
can be expected to have long-term and far-reaching consequences. 
By taking upon itself the power to change the definition of 
marriage, the state, through judicial action, is effectively 
dismantling the connection between marriage and family. The state 
gains power through this move, while the family, and its most 
defenseless members, our children, lose their bearings.81 
 [Each case mandating genderless marriage] makes of marriage a 
legal form. That is, by putting aside both the history of the 
institution and its place and meaning in ordinary moral and social 
commerce, the Court reduces marriage entirely to law. With this, 
marriage is not only fully politicized, but, in a very real sense, 
becomes territory conquered by state law. This conquest comes at 
a very great cost, both for liberty and for the plurality that is its 
test and expression.82 
IV.  THE COURT OF APPEALS DISSENTING OPINION AND ITS 
ELISIONS 
As with the majority in Hernandez AD, the majority in Hernandez 
COA acknowledged key aspects of the social institutional argument, 
again primarily by citation to and approving quotation from83 Justice 
Cordy’s articulation of the argument in Goodridge.84 And, as with the 
AD dissenting opinion, the COA dissenting opinion fails to engage 
that argument but rather proceeds as if oblivious to the social 
institutional realities demonstrated by it. In so doing, the COA 
dissenting opinion both repeats some of the AD dissenting opinion’s 
elisions and deploys elisions not seen there. 
A. Repeating Elisions 
The COA dissenting opinion uses the “close personal 
relationship” component of the “convenient false assumption” elision, 
and does so in connection with its use of the “evolving social 
 
 81. Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added); see DeCoste, supra note 72, at 632–37. 
 82. DeCoste, supra note 72, at 639–40. 
 83. Hernandez v. Robles, No. 86, 2006 WL 1835429, at *13–14 (N.Y. July 6, 2006) (Graffeo, 
J., concurring). 
 84. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
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institution” counter. Even more baldly than does the AD dissenting 
opinion, the COA dissenting opinion asserts that marriage is nothing 
more than the close personal relationship model. “Only since the mid-
twentieth century has the institution of marriage come to be 
understood as a relationship between two equal partners, founded 
upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional support.”85 
But, as already shown, that proffered description of the contemporary 
American marriage institution is so incomplete as to be 
fundamentally false.86 Thus, the same criticism fairly leveled at the AD 
dissenting opinion’s use of this elision applies with at least equal force 
to the COA dissenting opinion’s similar performance.87 
The same can be said of the COA dissenting opinion’s use of the 
related “evolving social institution” counter. That opinion says that 
“the common understanding of ‘marriage’ has changed dramatically 
over the centuries . . . .”88 But like the AD dissenting opinion, the 
COA dissenting opinion fails to show either that the “evolution” has 
removed the constitutive meaning of “the union of a man and a 
woman” from the contemporary marriage institution so that the law’s 
task is simply to “adjust accordingly”89 or that the change not yet (and 
maybe never to be) chosen or “evolved” by society is so wise that a 
court ought to impose it on society by no less than the force of 
“constitutional” law. Indeed, the COA dissenting opinion does not 
even attempt either intellectual task; this aspect of its judicial 
performance is thus rather woefully deficient. 
B. The “Armless Stick-Figure” Elision 
Perhaps nowhere does the COA dissenting opinion elide the 
social institutional realities of marriage more than in its discussion of 
the due process/fundamental right issue. 
Federal and state courts have long recognized as “fundamental” 
the right of a person to participate in the man/woman marriage 
 
 85. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 86. See supra section III.A. 
 87. See supra section III.A. 
 88. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 89. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting) ("As the institution of marriage 
has been redefined within modern American society, the law has adjusted accordingly."). 
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institution,90 and that is how the majority of the Court of Appeals saw 
that right.91 On that basis, and because our society has never 
recognized a personal right to enter—and a corresponding 
governmental duty to create and sustain—the genderless marriage 
institution, the majority held that no such personal right exists.92 
The COA dissenting opinion’s simple but startling tactic relative 
to this issue was to ignore or otherwise cast aside all aspects of the 
fundamental right to enter the man/woman marriage institution 
except the one sliver that can apply to same-sex couples: “Central to 
the right to marry is the right to marry the person of one’s choice.”93 
That “central” aspect of the right then quickly became, in the 
opinion’s treatment, the only aspect.94 
Any defensible analysis of a “right to marry” must address what 
marriage is. Otherwise the right has no external or objective referent; 
it becomes nothing other than a purely personal construct, one free-
floating form among others in a solipsistic vision of the universe. And 
as to what marriage is, the majority proceeded on the uncontroversial 
understanding that marriage is a vital social institution that, like all 
social institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings. 
For the marriage institution, one of these core meanings is “the union 
of a man and a woman,” with that meaning being uniquely productive 
of a variety of valuable social goods mostly centered in the creation 
and rearing of children. 
The binary nature of marriage—its inclusion of one woman and 
one man—reflects the biological fact that human procreation cannot 
be accomplished without the genetic contribution of both a male and 
a female. Marriage creates a supportive environment for procreation 
to occur and the resulting offspring to be nurtured. Although 
plaintiffs suggest that the connection between procreation and 
marriage has become anachronistic because of scientific advances in 
assisted reproduction technology, the fact remains that the vast 
 
 90. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967); Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (N.Y. 1979). 
 91. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *4–5; id. at *8–11 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *15 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at *15–17. 
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majority of children are conceived naturally through sexual contact 
between a woman and a man.95 
In contrast, the dissent proceeded on the notion that marriage is 
nothing other than state sanction of an intensely personal adult desire 
and choice to bond to another adult.96 In an effort to support this 
childless take on the nature of marriage, the dissent said that “the 
protections that the State gives to couples who do marry—such as the 
right to own property as a unit or to make medical decisions for each 
other—are focused largely on the adult relationship, rather than on 
the couple’s possible role as parents.”97 But that assertion is 
problematic; it simply does not follow that legal recognition of 
familial property and familial responsibility for health care is 
unconnected to the great human endeavor of child-begetting and 
child-rearing, an endeavor undertaken by a substantial majority of 
adult Americans.98 This problem with the dissent’s approach is actually 
just a small part of what is the larger problem of the entire genderless 
marriage project. That project simply cannot, by any means, get past 
the uncontroversial social institutional reality that societies across 
cultures and millennia—including contemporary American society, 
limited enclaves excepted—have sustained the man/woman marriage 
institution in large measure because it effectively connects a man and 
a woman and the children resulting from their passionate coupling in 
ways (many unique) that well perpetuate not just the species but the 
society itself, including all its valuable social institutions.99 
 
 95. Id. at *9 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
 96. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *14 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (speaking of how the 
same-sex couple plaintiffs "grew up hoping to find that one person with whom they would share 
their future, eager to express their mutual lifetime pledge through civil marriage."). 
 97. Id. at *21. 
 98. Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women: June 2004, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS P20-555 (U.S. Census Bureau Dec. 2005); Suzanne M. Bianchi & Lynne M. Casper, 
American Families, Population Bull. 55(4), 18 (2000). 
 99. See, e.g., Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, What About the Children? Liberal 
Cautions on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE, supra note 76, at 29–
52; Maggie Gallagher, (How) Does Marriage Protect Child Well-Being?, in THE MEANING 
OF MARRIAGE, supra note 76, at 197–212; W. Bradford Wilcox, Suffer the Little Children: 
Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonwealth, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE, supra note 
76, at 242–54; Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 4, at 41–62; Somerville, supra note 11, at 63–78; 
Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply 
to Andrew Koppelman, 2 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33, 45 (2004) ("Marriage is a virtually universal 
social institution. . . . [M]arriage [everywhere] has something to do with bringing together a man 
and a woman into a public—not merely private—sexual union, in which the rights and 
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So when analyzing “a right to marry,” and therefore necessarily 
considering what marriage is, the majority does a rather good job of 
depicting the institution while the dissent clearly does not, exactly 
because it elides institutional realities.100 It is as if, when requested to 
represent the human form, one responds by bringing forth 
Michelangelo’s David and another responds with an armless stick-
figure drawing. 
C. The “Child Welfare” Elision 
The COA dissenting opinion attempts to characterize the “state 
interest” in man/woman marriage as “mandating” or “encouraging” or 
“promoting” procreation.101 Here, the opinion is merely deploying the 
same tactic used in the Canadian and Massachusetts cases ordering 
genderless marriage but since discredited. 
[Those] cases elide the States’ argument from one premised on 
marriage as society’s mechanism for the regulation and 
amelioration of the consequences of passionate and procreative 
heterosexual intercourse (children) to one premised on the silly 
view of marriage as a mechanism mandating procreation. [Those] 
majority opinions do not acknowledge the elision and, 
consequently, do not seek to justify it, and no justification 
independently presents itself.102 
 
responsibilities of the husband and wife towards each other and any children their sexual union 
produces are publicly—not privately—defined and enforced."); Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex 
Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal Justifications for the Regulation of 
Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 451–71 (2004); Maggie 
Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law Support 
Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225, 231–34 (2004); Maggie Gallagher, 
What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 781–91 
(2002). 
Likewise, the genderless marriage project cannot get past the uncontroversial social 
institutional reality that a society cannot have both—but must choose between—the child-
centered man/woman marriage institution and the adult-centered genderless marriage 
institution. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 24–26. 
 100. The COA dissenting opinion sets up and knocks down a straw man when it asserts that 
the man/woman meaning in marriage is a mere legal, artificial definition that, because 
invidiously discriminatory, cannot be allowed to preclude any longer same-sex couples from 
marrying. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). The social institutional 
argument for man/woman marriage does not include or advance any notion of "definitional 
preclusion"; rather, it demonstrates the essential bond between the man/woman meaning and 
the marriage institution's nature, purposes, and social goods. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 15–24. 
 101. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *20–21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 102. Stewart, supra note 34, at 62. 
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The COA dissenting opinion’s use of this particular elision is 
doubly troubling in light of the fact that the majority in Hernandez 
COA clearly articulated society’s genuine interest not to mandate or 
even necessarily to encourage procreation but to provide support to 
the social institution that best ameliorates the consequences of 
procreation resulting from passionate heterosexual coupling.103 
A closely related elision seen in the COA dissenting opinion is 
this: It ignores one government endeavor relevant to marriage and 
speaks only of a much different one. Those two different 
governmental endeavors are, on one hand, sustaining the child-
centered and child-protective social institution of man/woman 
marriage and, on the other hand, assuring equal legal benefits to all 
children, regardless of who heads their domicile. Here is how the 
COA dissenting opinion ignores the former and speaks as if only the 
latter advances legitimate societal interests: 
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of 
children, but excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no way 
furthers this interest. In fact, it undermines it. Civil marriage 
provides tangible legal protections and economic benefits to 
married couples and their children, and tens of thousands of 
children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New 
York. Depriving these children of the benefits and protections 
available to the children of opposite-sex couples is antithetical to 
their welfare . . . . The State’s interest in a stable society is 
rationally advanced when families are established and remain 
intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.104 
But this analysis is valid, of course, only to the extent that 
sustaining the child-centered and child-protective institution of 
man/woman marriage is the same governmental endeavor as 
protecting “the welfare of children” (as the dissenting opinion uses 
that concept). This is not at all clear. Reflection suggests that the two 
endeavors are substantially different. Protecting the present welfare 
of individual children found in varying circumstances is, in the way the 
COA dissenting opinion addresses it, the provision of legal benefits to 
individuals (or their care-takers). By contrast, sustaining man/woman 
marriage entails the protection and perpetuation of a social 
 
 103. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *2–4; id. at *13–14 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at *21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
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institution—which benefits, both now and in the generations to come, 
the children resulting from passionate, procreative heterosexual 
coupling, the vast majority of all children. Thus understood, the two 
different governmental protective endeavors are just that, different. 
The COA dissenting opinion disappoints in that it provides no 
demonstration of the equivalency or overlap of the two endeavors 
and thus provides no justification for its refusal to acknowledge and 
give due weight to the institution-protecting endeavor.105 
D. The “Over/Under-Inclusive” Elision 
The COA dissenting opinion elides other social institutional 
realities when it invokes and attempts to apply the venerable 
“over/under-inclusive” doctrine of equal protection jurisprudence.106 
One elided reality is the connection between the man/woman 
meaning now constitutive of the marriage institution and the valuable 
social goods produced by that meaning. To acknowledge that reality is 
to acknowledge that the “fit” between the impugned meaning and the 
societal objective (those very social goods)—rather than being under- 
or over-inclusive—is quite precise indeed. After all, to suppress that 
meaning is to lose those goods; certainly the “any two persons” 
meaning will not produce them.107 
Another elided reality is this: a society can have at any one time 
only the man/woman marriage institution or the genderless marriage 
institution or no normative marriage institution at all. For the Court 
of Appeals, the choice was actually between the two presently 
possible normative marriage institutions—man/woman or 
genderless—because no party was calling for the 
deinstitutionalization of marriage. The court’s task thus does not seem 
well-defined as determining whether a hypothetical and more 
narrowly- or broadly-drawn statutory scheme better “fits” or “suits” 
or “serves” a specific statutory objective than does the impugned 
statute. In other words, the judicial task was little akin to sorting 
through the gender discrimination in a statute allowing females to 
 
 105. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 106. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *20–21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). A good treatment of 
the doctrine is R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, 
Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement, 
Relationship, and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279 (1994). 
 107. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 15–24. 
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drink beer at age 18 while setting the age for males at 21108 or to 
evaluating the line-drawing in a statute that required local franchising 
of antenna and television facilities, but not other private facilities that 
also used no public rights-of-way.109 Rather, the Court of Appeals’ task 
was either to mandate the genderless marriage institution by force of 
“constitutional” law, and thereby necessarily suppress the man/woman 
marriage institution, or to leave it to democratic processes to choose 
one or the other of the two marriage institutions. Seen in this light—a 
stark choice between one marriage institution and its unique social 
goods and a radically different marriage institution and its (promised) 
social goods—the over/under-inclusive doctrine seems ill-suited to the 
judicial task really at hand. 
E. The Racial Analogy and Institutional Realities 
Both the COA dissenting opinion and the AD dissenting opinion 
deployed repeatedly the argument of the racial analogy, also known 
as the argument of the Perez/Loving analogy.110 The argument of the 
Perez/Loving analogy, in its simplest form, goes like this: Because it is 
unconstitutional (as unequal and unfair) to prevent a black from 
marrying a white, it is likewise unconstitutional to prevent a man from 
marrying a man or a woman from marrying a woman. But in 
deploying that argument, both dissenting opinions proceeded 
apparently oblivious to certain social institutional realities implicated 
by their use of the Perez/Loving analogy. 
Because marriage is a vital social institution, it performs an 
important educative and socializing function. As seen, in its sphere the 
marriage institution shapes and guides individuals’ identities, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct, including what they believe to 
be important and what they strive to achieve. But exactly because 
marriage has a powerful educative role in our society—a power 
reinforced by the supporting law’s authoritative voice—the marriage 
institution is a tempting target for those seeking to advance the 
 
 108. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 109. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
 110. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 379–81, 381 n.3, 382 (Saxe, J., dissenting); Hernandez, 2006 
WL 1865429, at *16–17, 20 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). In 1948, the California Supreme Court, in 
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), led the way for the nation by holding that statutory 
prohibitions of interracial marriages violated constitutional protections of equality. Then, in 
1967, the United States Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), held the same. 
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sociopolitical purposes of an ideology unrelated to marriage. If those 
so seeking can appropriate the institution and bend it to their 
purposes, they have gone far in assuring the triumph of their agenda. 
In the American past, two social movements temporarily 
succeeded in using marriage as a means to achieve ulterior ends: the 
white supremacist movement and the eugenics movement.111 In fact, 
the anti-miscegenation laws were often found in the same legislative 
package as the laws calling for the sterilization of “idiots” and other 
so-called “genetic undesirables.”112 Central to the white supremacists’ 
project was the alteration of the core meaning of marriage from the 
union of a man and a woman to the union of a man and a woman of 
the same “race.”113 Laws that prohibited blacks from marrying whites 
were an ugly feature grafted onto the marriage institution—the very 
logic of which makes the graft a foreign object.114 The voice of those 
laws, however, greatly magnified by social institutional power, subtly 
but effectively inculcated throughout society the core dogma of white 
supremacy. The courts that gave us the Perez and Loving decisions 
apprehended the white supremacists’ marriage project for what it was 
and rightly used constitutional equality norms to dismantle it.115 In the 
process, those courts restored to marriage the integrity of its 
institutional purposes and logic, a historic accomplishment.116 
Substantial evidence supports the understanding that a primary 
goal of the gay/lesbian rights movement’s genderless marriage project, 
like that of the white supremacists, is to appropriate the institution 
and change it to achieve sociopolitical purposes unrelated to 
marriage.117 Again, that change entails an alteration in a core, 
constitutive meaning—from the union of a man and a woman to the 
union of any two persons. Granted that the respective objectives of 
the old and the new marriage projects are very different, still the 
projects in their appropriative strategy are of a kind. 
 
 111. Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and 
Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 557, 567–70. 
 112. Id. at 567–70. 
 113. Id. 
 114. The common law had no racial restrictions relative to marriage. Id. at 567. 
 115. Id. at 570–75. 
 116. Id. at 575. 
 117. Id. at 581–88. 
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Thus, because Perez and Loving refused to allow the marriage 
institution to be appropriated for nonmarriage ends, to use those two 
cases to advance just such an appropriative project is to betray them. 
In other words, the Perez/Loving argument advances a superficial 
analogy that masks a deep disanalogy. That disanalogy is between the 
intention of Perez and Loving to protect marriage from appropriation 
for nonmarriage purposes and the intention of the present marriage 
project to make such an appropriation. Thus, those who deploy the 
Perez/Loving argument, whether advocates or judges, are misleading 
people, including perhaps themselves.118 
Nor is this betrayal cured by an appeal to Perez’s and Loving’s 
vindication of constitutional equality norms—that is, by the argument 
that whereas the white supremacist marriage project fostered 
inequality by the exclusiveness of the antimiscegenation laws, the new 
marriage project fosters equality by the inclusiveness of its different 
redefinition of marriage. This, of course, is an argument that the ends 
justify the means, but the argument steadfastly ignores certain social 
institutional realities regarding those means. As already seen, one 
such reality is that an institution constituted by the core meaning of 
“the union of any two persons” is not a modification of the marriage 
institution but a radically different alternative to it.119 And, as also 
already seen, another reality is that, backed by the force of 
constitutional law, the new institution will, in not many years, displace 
and, in that fashion, destroy (deinstitutionalize) the old institution. 
For it is clear that society cannot, at one and the same time, tell the 
people (and especially the children) that marriage, in its core 
meaning, is the union of any two persons and that marriage, in its core 
meaning, is the union of a man and a woman.120 The final institutional 
reality is that when the man/woman marriage institution goes, its 
array of valuable and unique social goods goes also.121 
Thus, the pressing question with respect to the dissenting 
opinions’ use of the argument from the Perez/Loving analogy is 
whether an “equality” enshrined at such a cost to human development 
and social welfare is indeed the equality vindicated by Perez and 
Loving or otherwise demanded by our constitutional norms. The 
 
 118. Id. at 558. 
 119. See supra section II. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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dissenting opinions provide no answer, again because they elide 
rather than engage the social institutional realities relative to 
marriage. The correct answer is rather clearly “no.”122 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Both the AD dissenting opinion and the COA dissenting opinion 
failed to engage the social institutional argument for man/woman 
marriage. Indeed, those opinions repeatedly proceeded on the basis of 
assumptions or assertions regarding the contemporary American 
marriage institution that are unsupported in the opinions themselves 
and, more seriously, that stand contradicted by recent and clearly 
observable social phenomena. The AD dissenting opinion erred 
materially when it denied that “the union of a man and a woman” 
continues as a shared public meaning at the core and constitutive of 
the institution, when it stated that the man/woman meaning is not 
productive of valuable social goods, and when it asserted that 
replacement of that meaning with “the union of any two persons” will 
result in an unchanged marriage institution and therefore in no 
“down-side” to society. Moreover, the AD dissenting opinion’s own 
references to John Locke’s influential writings on government and 
society materially undercut the opinion’s ultimate conclusion in favor 
of judicially-mandated genderless marriage. The COA dissenting 
opinion, when the judicial task relative to a fundamental right to 
marry called for an adequate description of what marriage is, gave the 
equivalent of an armless stick-figure drawing. That opinion in its 
treatment of the welfare of children also elided society’s, and hence 
government’s, important institution-protective endeavor and elided, 
in its use of the over/under-inclusive doctrine, the precise fit between 
the man/woman meaning and the resulting valuable social goods that 
continue to generate such broad societal support for the man/woman 
marriage institution.123 Finally, a fair assessment of the social 
institutional realities relative to marriage rather thoroughly discredits 




 122. Stewart & Duncan, supra note 111, at 588–95. 
 123. Regarding that broad societal support, see supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
